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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

JUSTICE ADVANCED: COMMENTS ON WILLIAM NELSON’S
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
LEGAL REALISM

ROBERT J. COTTROL*
The approaching fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark
school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education1 should be, and
indeed is, a time for considerable national reflection. Brown invites us to take
a long look—sometimes hopeful, often painful—at our nation’s racial history.
That look brings us face-to-face with the world of race, law, and caste before
the landmark decision and how the world has changed and not changed in the
decision’s wake. Brown also provides an enduring invitation to examine the
Supreme Court and indeed the judiciary more broadly, and to ask questions
about the proper role of Hamilton’s “least dangerous branch” in our national
governance.2 The latter look might be even more difficult and problematic
than the former. For those of us who have come of intellectual age since 1954
and who have since then received university training and pursued careers in
law, history, political science, and kindred subjects, Brown has imbued the
courts with a patina of enlightenment that I believe is scarcely deserved—or
perhaps better, ill deserved—in light of the broader history of the judiciary in
American life. Brown has contributed to a kind of historical amnesia. It has
helped push to the periphery of our collective consciousness the Supreme
Court’s many constitutional lapses, Dred Scott v. Sandford,3 United States v.
Cruikshank,4 Plessy v. Ferguson,5 Lochner v. New York,6 and Korematsu v.
United States,7 to name but a small fraction. These are cases we in the legal
academy often quickly pass over in our Constitutional Law courses as we
move on to modern equal protection or fundamental rights analysis. Even
* Harold Paul Green Research Professor of Law, and Professor of History and Sociology, The
George Washington University. A.B., Yale University, 1971; Ph.D., Yale University, 1978; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1978. I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of
Raymond T. Diamond.
1. 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888).
3. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
4. 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1875).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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worse, these discussions are frequently relegated to optional legal history
courses, taken only by the relatively small percentage of our students who have
a curiosity concerning the law’s past. But Brown has contributed to a view that
the courts are perhaps best equipped to handle the difficult issues, the Gordian
Knots that often vex the body politic.8 Whether that view, which many in the
legal academy heartily endorse, will prove to be good law or good policy in the
long run remains to be seen, but nonetheless it reflects two journeys that
American society and the courts took in the early decades of the Twentieth
Century. The jurisprudential odyssey that took the Court from its previous
position as a body indifferent—and more often than not hostile—to minority
rights and the Civil War Amendments designed to protect them to Brown is a
complex story. It is a story that can tell us a good deal about the evolution of
race and the culture of race in the first half of the Twentieth Century. It is a
story that also has much to tell us about the evolution of styles of legal
reasoning in the same time period.
It is this latter task that William Nelson ably performs in his article Brown
v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal Realism.9 As his title
suggests, William Nelson is viewing the Brown decision through the lens of
legal realism, telling us how an important shift in the style of judicial reasoning
in the Twentieth Century explicitly and implicitly played a role in bringing
about the decision in Brown. Brown naturally enough invites us to consider
the impact of the legal history of race in the Court’s decision-making. Few
would discuss the landmark desegregation decision without at least a passing
reference to the history of the NAACP and the organization’s heroic struggle
against Jim Crow, lynching, and disenfranchisement.10 Certainly, Charles
Hamilton Houston’s reforms at the Howard Law School and his transformation
of that institution into a cutting edge training ground for civil rights litigators is
an inevitable part of any history that takes us from Plessy to Brown.11
Similarly, Thurgood Marshall—his early efforts at civil rights litigation, and
particularly his and Charles Houston’s decision to go after the politically lesssensitive target of segregation in state professional schools instead of the more
emotionally charged issue of separate elementary and secondary schools—is

8. See, e.g., ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND, & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN
208-33 (2003).
9. William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal
Realism, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 795 (2004).
10. Certainly these themes have been discussed in most of the works tracing the history of
Brown. See, e.g., COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 34-48; RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 84-125 (1975); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001).
11. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 56-57.

V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

JUSTICE ADVANCED

841

an important part of the history.12 Similarly, shifting racial mores played a key
role in taking the Court on the road to Brown. Works in the social sciences
like the 1944 publication of Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar
Myrdal’s An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem And Modern Democracy
went a long way toward convincing many educated Americans of the
contradictions between the nation’s professed egalitarianism and the practice
of segregation and discrimination.13 The horrors of Hitler’s final solution went
even further in convincing many that the strident racism that was so prevalent
in the nation at the beginning of the century contradicted both basic
Americanism and basic decency.14
I think it is fair to say that most people with a decent sense of
constitutional history have a good appreciation for how the nation’s evolution
in racial thinking contributed to the Court’s decision in Brown. But I think
William Nelson’s article invites us to visit somewhat less-traveled precincts.
Nelson’s article properly directs our attention not simply to the larger odyssey
of the nation’s racial evolution but more narrowly and deeply to the legal
profession, particularly the elite bar and bench, the changes in the profession’s
methodology, and the impact those changes had on the 1954 decision. We in
the legal academy tend not to use the term methodology as frequently as our
counterparts in the social sciences and yet, of course, there are significant
methodological issues both in the craft of lawyering or presenting a case and
equally in the craft of judicial decision-making. Certainly, methodological
issues have been part of the enduring controversy surrounding Brown.15 Why
did the Warren decision give such short shrift to the intentions of the
framers?16 Should social science—Kenneth Clark’s experiment with dolls or
Gunnar Myrdal’s American Dilemma—have played any role in the decision?17
Could the companion case Bolling v. Sharpe,18 outlawing school segregation in
the District of Columbia, be legitimate? Bolling was grounded in the Fifth
Amendment, which was written by slaveholders. The Fifth Amendment was
certainly not originally intended to provide equal treatment of people of
different races, much less require the integration of schools or indeed anything

12. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
13. GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
14. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 97.
15. Id. at 220-25.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 214. Dennis Hutchinson’s research indicates that, despite the frequent criticism of
the social science evidence in footnote 11 in Brown, the evidence probably played only a minor,
if any, role in the actual decision-making. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979).
18. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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else.19 The critiques of the Warren decision on methodological grounds have
persisted, generating a debate that has had a much longer life than that initially
offered by defenders of racial segregation.20
And yet to understand the Warren Court’s methodology we must, as
Nelson reminds us, learn how legal reasoning and legal argumentation would
change in the first decades of the Twentieth Century. The growth of the legal
realist movement and its influence on the bar, the judiciary, and legal
education has, of course, been a well-explored topic in the legal and historical
literature.21 Yet how do we link that familiar story with the story of the
nation’s racial evolution in the Twentieth Century? How do these two
histories merge to produce Brown, or at least the historic Brown and not some
alternative history that we might envision?22 To understand this, we have to
come to gain an appreciation of the history of legal realism. What are the
common threads of legal realism as a movement? How did it go from a
posture in the early Twentieth Century of urging judicial deference to
legislative initiatives to the view later in the Twentieth Century, highlighted by
Brown, that the courts could play a leading role as vehicles for legal and social
change, essentially Nelson’s metaphor of shifting from caboose to engine, if
you will? This is a difficult task. As someone who is not a student of legal
realism per se, I am not sure that the boundaries between the realists and their
predecessors are as clearly defined as some would have it. I tend to agree with
Morton Horwitz that “defining [l]egal [r]ealism with precision is not all that
easy.”23 Horwitz also noted that “[l]egal [r]ealism was neither a coherent
intellectual movement nor a consistent or systematic jurisprudence. It
expressed more an intellectual mood than a clear body of tenets, more a set of
sometimes contradictory tendencies than a rigorous set of methodologies or
propositions about legal theory.”24
Should legal realism be defined largely as an intellectual movement that
flourished at the law schools at Yale and Columbia, and that formed in
opposition to the spare, deductive, Langdellian case method that began at

19. This was part of the late Raoul Berger’s critique of the Supreme Court’s desegregation
jurisprudence. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 210 n.66 (1977).
20. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 212-33.
21. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–
1960 (1986).
22. For an important set of writings detailing alternative ways the Brown opinion might have
been written, see WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S
TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001).
23. HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 169.
24. Id.
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Harvard and would ultimately come to dominate American legal education?25
That is probably a good start, but it does not really flesh out the full contours of
the realist movement nor, of course, our concern for the implications of realism
for Brown. Is the realist movement best described by its protagonists who
emphasized the role of indeterminacy, rationalization, and perhaps plain
whimsy in determining judicial decision-making?26 I think the realists were on
to something more.
Probably the best way to approach the realists, certainly from the point of
view of understanding their ultimate contribution to the decision in Brown, is
to view them as advocates of a more policy-oriented, or at least, aware
jurisprudence, a policy-sensitive jurisprudence informed by some of the newer
developments in such social or behavioral science fields as sociology,
psychology, anthropology, and institutional economics, among others.27 But
even here our division between the realists and their Nineteenth Century
forbearers is not all that sharp. Certainly, policy considerations have never
really been far from judicial decision-making. Morton Horwitz and William
Nelson have informed us in other contexts of the critical role policy concerns
played in re-fashioning the received common law into an American common
law for the early Nineteenth Century.28 Nor can the application of social
science, or at least the forerunners of social science, to jurisprudence be
considered an innovation of Twentieth Century realists. For example, it would
be impossible to discuss the changes in contract doctrine that were occurring in
the Anglo-American world after the American Revolution without reference to
classical liberal economic theory.29 Justice Matthews’s opinion in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins indicates a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to allow
empirical evidence, admittedly of a simple and overwhelming sort, to play a
decisive role in equal protection jurisprudence as early as the 1880s.30

25. See id. at 170-72; KALMAN, supra note 21, at 67-97.
26. See KALMAN, supra note 21, at 8-10; N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of
Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1302, 1302 (1989).
27. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 182-83; KALMAN, supra note 21, at 17-20;
Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms—American and Scandinavian, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 138-42 (2002). Laura Kalman’s research indicates the often considerable
tension between scholars in the social sciences who regard legal realist scholars as untutored
amateurs and realists who regard the social sciences as being too underdeveloped to aid in the
formulation of law and policy. KALMAN, supra note 21, at 42.
28. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–
1860 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (1975).
29. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 292-323
(1979).
30. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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I would also argue that Justice Harlan, the great dissenter in Plessy v.
Ferguson,31 is under-appreciated as a legal realist. Certainly, his opinions in
the two great civil rights cases of his tenure, the Civil Rights Cases32 and
Plessy, illustrate Harlan’s ability to look beyond the formal legal logic
presented in those cases and to instead draw upon his own experiences and
insights as a man of the South and indeed a former slaveholder. These gave
Harlan an ability to see the realities of stigma and subordination inherent in the
emerging Jim Crow world of the redeemed South in ways that escaped his
more formalistically minded colleagues. Harlan’s realist jurisprudence did not
end there. The early anti-trust case United States v. E.C. Knight, provided
another occasion for Harlan to display his realist temperament in dissent.33
Harlan’s ability in E.C. Knight to look past traditional definitions, and to
consider commerce in light of the actual impact of manufacturing in the
economy of his 1890s, and not the framers’ 1790s, anticipated the Court’s
realist jurisprudence with its acquiescence to the New Deal by four decades.34
Harlan, of course, was not the only realist on the Court at the start of the
Twentieth Century.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is more widely
acknowledged as one of the pioneer realists; he was an early critic of
Langdellian formalism and a forthright advocate of the application of scientific
learning to judicial problem-solving.35 I think Holmes’s career actually gets us
closer to our concerns with Brown and perhaps to Nelson’s concern of whether
or not a realist jurisprudence causes the law to act like society’s caboose or
engine. Holmes has been celebrated by modern legal scholars for his
deferential opinion in Lochner v. New York36 and condemned for his
endorsement of eugenics in Buck v. Bell.37 In both cases Holmes was arguing
for a broad deference to state authorities based, at least in part, on his own
perceptions of good public policy. Holmes would also show this policy-based
willingness to defer in cases involving racial discrimination. Despite his
Boston background and his service with Union forces during the Civil War,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, like the majority of the Court before the first World
War, could be counted on as a reasonably reliable vote to sustain southern

31. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
32. 109 U.S. 3, 33-57 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18-46 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. For a critical discussion of Chief Justice Fuller’s majority opinion as an example of the
formalist approach, see Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1089-1097 (2000).
35. See generally O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); O.W. Holmes, Jr., Book
Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233 (1880) (reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (2d ed. 1879)).
36. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic
Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833 (1986).
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measures mandating Jim Crow and disenfranchisement. He voted with the
majority in Berea College v. Kentucky to sustain a state statute mandating
segregation in private colleges.38 He also authored the Court’s opinion in Giles
v. Harris denying equitable relief to black applicants who were effectively
disenfranchised by registrars of voters in Alabama.39
Holmes’s racial conservatism matched that of the Court more broadly and I
think needs to be brought into our conversation about race and realism. If
realism incorporates Cardozo’s notion that there must be a sociological
component to the judicial enterprise—that the felt needs of society, perhaps as
reflected by the better scholarship in the social sciences, should be reflected in
judicial opinions—then the racial conservatism of the Berea and Giles courts
and other opinions of the era should be numbered in the realist corpus. If the
Court was willing to eviscerate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it
was willing to do so not because a formalistic logic demanded such—indeed
Giles and its companion case required heroic exertions to avoid the clear
demands of the Fifteenth Amendment—but because the justices thought
disenfranchisement was at least a reasonable policy option.40 In doing so, the
38. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908).
39. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903). For a discussion of this case, see COTTROL,
DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 46.
40. See COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 45-47 for a discussion of Giles, 189
U.S. 475 and Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904). It illustrates the ability of the Court in the
early Twentieth Century to effectively nullify the Fifteenth Amendment:
Another major constitutional issue facing the Court in the first decades of the
twentieth century was the increasing disenfranchisement of black voters in the southern
states. The Fifteenth Amendment prevented the states from directly limiting the vote to
whites, as had been the case before the Civil War. Nonetheless, a number of southern
state governments had found what they hoped would be a series of legal loopholes around
the constitutional requirement that black and white have equal access to the ballot box. A
case that arose in Alabama in 1902 can illustrate how these loopholes worked. A new
provision of the Alabama Constitution called for a new registration of voters. All voters
registered in 1902 were to be registered for life. Those who registered in 1902 were
required to take a relatively easy test to demonstrate their literacy and qualifications to be
electors. After 1902 the literacy test was made considerably more difficult. In 1902 in
Montgomery, Alabama, the registrar of voters simply refused to register black men,
making them ineligible for registration under the easier standards. This brought about the
case of Giles v. Harris (1903). Giles, a black man, filed on his behalf and on the behalf of
[5,000] other Afro-American men denied the right to register in 1902. Giles sought
equitable relief, asking the courts to compel the registrar to register him and the other
men.
The case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1903. In a majority opinion written
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court denied Giles requested relief. The grounds
for doing so was that the requested relief was equitable relief. The Holmes opinion
indicated that the Court would be reluctant to give Giles an equitable remedy that would,
in effect, require the Court to supervise the activities of state voting officials. Holmes
expressed the view that this would be beyond the prerogatives of the Court and would
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Court was following the sociological wisdom of the day. The leading lights in
the biological and social sciences were proclaiming the superiority of the
Nordic races and the Darwinian debacle that would surely follow if the inferior
races were not allowed, indeed encouraged, to die out as presumably nature
intended.41
The historical profession went even further. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were mistakes, unfortunate products of Reconstruction, “a tragic
era” in which sectional rivalries had caused a vengeful North to unwisely
impose Negro rule on the defeated South. This view, put forward by Columbia
University historian William A. Dunning and his disciples, was the prevailing
view on the part of the historical profession—and indeed the general public—
on the Reconstruction era for the first half of the Twentieth Century and
beyond.42 It had an inevitable effect on the Court’s unwillingness to provide
robust enforcement for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments before the
Second World War. It also helped shape the opinion in Brown. I think we
have to realize that one of the reasons the Warren opinion is reluctant to
engage the Fourteenth Amendment’s history is precisely because Warren and
the other members of the Brown Court came of age at a time when the
Dunning school view of Reconstruction was largely uncontested.43 That they
heavily involve the Court in the political process of the state of Alabama. The Holmes
opinion suggested that Giles’s remedy was more likely to be a legal remedy—monetary
damages for deprivation of his civil rights.
The next year the Court heard a case directly on that issue. Giles was back in the
case of Giles v. Teasley (1904). This time Giles was asking for monetary damages in the
amount of $5,000 for the refusal of the Montgomery County Board of Registrars to
register him. The opinion of the Court, this time authored by Justice William Rufus Day,
was something of a masterpiece of judicial double-talk. The Day opinion sustained the
ruling of the Alabama Supreme Court. That court had said in effect that either the
provisions of the Alabama Constitution under which the registrars operated were
repugnant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in which case they had no legal
effect and hence no damages were owed Giles, or they were not repugnant to the
Constitution, in which case the registrars were operating within the scope of their
authority and no damages were owed Giles. The Giles cases left the Fifteenth
Amendment a constitutional right without any effective remedy.
41. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 81-82.
42. See, e.g., CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REVOLUTION AFTER LINCOLN
(1929); PAUL H. BUCK, THE ROAD TO REUNION 1865–1900 (1937); WILLIAM ARCHIBALD
DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 1865–1877 (1907). The basic tenets
of the Dunning school were also put forward in the popular culture before the second World War.
Thomas Dixon’s virulently racist novel, The Clansman, helped popularize the “tragic era” view
of Reconstruction (see THOMAS DIXON, JR., THE CLANSMAN: AN HISTORICAL ROMANCE OF THE
KUKLUX KLAN (1905)) as did D.W. Griffith’s 1915 film, Birth of a Nation, derived from Dixon’s
novel. The view was also put forward, in a somewhat softened version, in the 1939 hit movie,
Gone with the Wind.
43. For the major study in opposition to the Dunning school before World War II, see
W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

JUSTICE ADVANCED

847

would believe that the history of the Reconstruction-era Thirty-ninth Congress,
which sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification, would
provide little support for a robustly egalitarian interpretation of the
Amendment is hardly surprising.44 So if Berea or Giles might also be included
in the realist tradition, how does realism help us get from Plessy to Brown and
beyond, and can it help us with that vexing question of whether law is
ultimately leading or following social change? I think the answer lies partly in
the question of what kind of nonlegal information is informing judicial
decision-making. It is probably too simplistic to think of judges as either
leading or following society, simply ratifying and solidifying social change
that has occurred, or being the engine pulling society along to their vision of a
more just social order. Instead, I think it might be more accurate to view
judicial opinion-making as part of an ongoing symbiotic dialogue between
jurists and other select intellectual and cultural elites. Jurists have always been
expected to understand the basic frames of reference of educated elites. In the
Twentieth Century, increasingly that understanding came to presuppose at least
a nodding acquaintance with the social sciences. I would like to, in this regard,
nominate Langdell as having made a largely unheralded contribution to the
growth of legal realism. It was Langdell who developed the American model
of legal education, which among other things called for the relatively unique
feature of an undergraduate degree in a subject other than law to be followed
by a legal education following the Langdellian case method.45 This

PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, 1860–1880 (1935). DuBois’s work was quite an achievement and anticipated the
work of such later historians of Reconstruction as Kenneth Stampp and Eric Foner. See ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 (1988); KENNETH
M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865–1877 (1965). DuBois’s study certainly did
not, at the time, have the impact on the national perception of Reconstruction that Dunning and
his disciples did. It would have been impossible for a black scholar at the time to have
successfully challenged the consensus of the historical establishment.
44. One interesting feature of the judicial deliberations in Brown is that Frankfurter appears
to have believed that some attention to then-prevailing views of Reconstruction was necessary.
Frankfurter’s clerk, Alexander Bickel, spent a good deal of the summer of 1953 researching the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part of the reason that Frankfurter had assigned
Bickel this task was because the then-prevailing study of the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment had tended to view the Amendment more in cynical political terms along Dunning
lines, and less as an important grant of judicially enforceable rights. See HORACE EDGAR FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908). Frankfurter appears, in part, to have
hoped that Bickel could come up with a somewhat more hopeful view of the Amendment. The
view that the history was “inconclusive” was in Bickel’s memo to Frankfurter and of course
found its way into the ultimate Warren opinion. In light of the then-prevailing view of
Reconstruction, “inconclusive” probably represented something of a step forward for advocates
of desegregation. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 166-68.
45. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S 36-37 (1983). I have noted the uniqueness of the undergraduate degree requirement
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undergraduate education had unintended consequences, or at least
consequences that I think were probably unintended by Langdell. It gave
prospective lawyers, particularly those who were graduates of elite colleges
and law schools, at least a constructive knowledge of what was going on in the
social sciences. If the undergraduate experience did not usually produce fullfledged anthropologists, economists, psychologists, or sociologists among
those who planned careers in the law, it at least produced an awareness of
those disciplines in their university incarnations. It also produced an
expectation. An educated attorney was one who was aware of these disciplines
and recognized their importance. An educated lawyer or jurist kept up with the
great or seemingly great thinkers in these fields. And an educated attorney or
jurist would consult experts in these fields to help resolve the difficult social
issues that came before the courts. This process started before Louis
Brandeis’s brief in Muller v. Oregon.46 It would grow during the course of the
Twentieth Century with the growth of the role of the social sciences in
undergraduate education.
Brown occurred in 1954 and not 1904 in part because of profound changes
in thinking about race on the part of educated elites. The efforts of Franz Boas
and his disciples to vanquish scientific racism and replace it with culturally
based explanations of group differences47 did not immediately eradicate
bigotry among university-educated elites. But increasingly, his work and
others like it were making the kind of raw racism that was the conventional
wisdom at the beginning of the Twentieth Century less and less respectable.
By the post-war era, spurred on by the horrors of the Nazi atrocities, the
dialogue on race and science had shifted even further. Social critics like T.W.
Adorno and Gordon Alport were even discussing racism as a kind of social
pathology.48 I think it is impossible to explain how we got to Brown without
acknowledging the profound changes in scientific thinking about race that
occurred in the first half of the Twentieth Century. The Brown Court followed
and ratified, to a large extent, changes in thinking that had already occurred
among the nation’s intellectual and cultural pace-setters.49 The 1954
desegregation decision also probably contributed to the long-run decline in

and its significance for American lawyering and judging elsewhere. See Robert J. Cottrol,
Creative Uncertainty, 81 TEX. L. REV. 627, 648 (2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002)).
46. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
47. See FRANZ BOAS, THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1963).
48. See T.W. ADORNO ET. AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950); GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
49. It should also be stressed that the Court was also ratifying changes in racial attitudes that
had occurred among a good many ordinary white Americans as well. See generally COTTROL,
DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 77-100.
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overt racism among both the nation’s elites and indeed ordinary citizens, but
the Court has to be considered overall a follower, not a leader, in this area.
All of which brings us back to Nelson’s metaphor of the caboose and the
engine. Let me submit that even post-Brown the Court has played more the
role of caboose than engine in cases involving racial inequality. This stands in
marked contrast to the Court’s role as engine in the sexual privacy cases,
Griswold and beyond.50 In this area the Court has imposed the views of those
of its members who believed that the Constitution should be read to protect an
expanded zone of sexual privacy, ultimately not really derived from either the
text or history of the Constitution, nor even from the initial Griswold
precedent.51 This jurisprudence is a response to shifting mores regarding
sexual activity among the nation’s cultural and intellectual pace-setters. Here,
the Court has been imposing the new thinking on frequently reluctant local and
perhaps national majorities.
But the Court’s jurisprudence with respect to racial inequality since the
1954 desegregation decision has been far more conservative. The major cases
have involved passing on measures enacted by the political branches of the
state and federal governments. Whether we are discussing the Court’s
sustaining of the public accommodations provision of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States52 or Justice O’Connor’s
opinion sustaining an affirmative action program in Grutter v. Bollinger,53 we
are talking about a body of jurisprudence that probably bears more
resemblance to the earlier legal realism—one that deferred to legislative
initiatives rather than to the work of the Court in Brown or in the privacy cases.
Indeed the Court has largely resisted innovative decision-making in cases
involving racial inequality. The Court’s refusal, for example, to require
desegregation across municipal lines in the 1974 case Milliken v. Bradley54
effectively limited the effectiveness of the earlier desegregation decision in
Brown. The affirmative action cases, I think, particularly illustrate Nelson’s
distinction between Cardozo’s “method of sociology,” which is progressive
but never radical in its quest to conform law to the needs and values of society,
and Dworkin’s approach, which empowers the judiciary to act as engines of
social change. This might be seen with the Bakke Court’s adoption of Justice
Powell’s diversity rationale as a constitutional justification for race-based
affirmative action programs in university admissions,55 rather than the
remedial rationale urged by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. It should be noted that Griswold emphasized that the decision was being made within the
scope of the marriage relationship. See id. at 485-86.
52. 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).
53. 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
54. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
55. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-14 (1978).
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Blackmun.56 The diversity rationale stresses the pedagogical value of
admitting under-represented minorities to universities. Presumably the
principal beneficiaries would be the universities themselves and white students
who are in the majority. Compensation for the effects of past, and indeed
present, discrimination are not considered constitutionally sufficient to justify
racially based affirmative action programs. Similarly, Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in Grutter found affirmative action constitutionally sustainable, again
not on a compensatory rationale but because affirmative action contributed to
the larger society’s needs, including its military and commercial operations.57
I am less worried than William Nelson about affirmative action or civil rights
justifications rooted in self-interest rationales. Racial justice, as a matter of
law and public policy, is more likely to survive over the long run if all or at
least most Americans perceive that they have a stake in eradicating racial
inequality. The O’Connor opinion, like that of Powell before her, and the
briefs of the United States government supporting desegregation in Brown58
are examples of enlightened self-interest at work, a force that I think, in the
long run, will have more staying power than either benevolence, guilt, or a
sense of justice.59 A perception that racially ameliorative measures only
benefit designated minorities instead of the society at large can only fuel
political and social opposition and be destructive of those measures, as indeed
they almost were in Bakke and Grutter. Brown made a difference precisely
because the advocates urging desegregation and the Court that accepted their
arguments tapped into the changed mood and needs of the nation. In doing so
they proved that they had learned the realist lesson well.

56. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
58. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (Nos. 8 et al.).
59. See generally COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 8, at 114; MARY L. DUDIZK,
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).

